As Start-Ups Fail, Venture Investors Back Out in Droves Financing: The
stampede to put money into tech has reversed direction, with some
partners selling out at a loss. April 14, 2001 | JOSEPH MENN | TIMES
STAFF WRITER For the last three years, investors large and small have
been clamoring at the gates of American venture capital funds, begging
for a chance to put money into technology start-ups. The funds provided
early financing for such companies as Amazon.com Inc., Sun Microsystems
Inc. and America Online Inc. before their initial stock offerings,
turning millions of dollars into billions for an elite group of
university endowments, pension funds and individuals worth at least $1
million. Just as suddenly, the stampede to get in has reversed
direction. And some of the dot-com chief executives who made it into the
party, committing to invest millions over a decade or so, are trying to
back out of their obligations. "It's hard to imagine the speed with
which it has happened," said Jon Staenberg of Staenberg Venture
Partners, based in Seattle. He has fielded withdrawal inquiries from two
investors in his $100-million venture fund who now have cold feet. Both
are executives at companies whose market value tumbled by 90% or more.
An overall decline in venture financing this year was already expected,
since the amount put into start-ups soared 80% to a record $68.8 billion
last year, according to research firm VentureOne. Fund returns to
investors went negative in the fourth quarter of 2000 for the first time
in more than two years, research firm Venture Economics said this week.
It won't be hard for the top venture capital firms, such as Amazon
funder Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, to raise cash. Those firms
have turned away hundreds of would-be limited partners in the past,
instead rewarding executives at companies they backed with permission to
invest. Many venture capital firms refuse to discuss the new
nervousness among their funders. "People are talking about it in hushed
tones, with great reluctance," Staenberg said. Those who will talk say
the pull-out isn't severe enough to impair the amount they invest in new
technologies, one of the major engines for economic growth in the last
decade. That's because individuals provide less than 20% of all venture
financing. But some are concerned that investments from big institutions
might decline for another reason: Many of them have financial plans
that call for allocating 5% or 10% of their assets to venture funds.
With those institutions' total portfolios shrinking along with the stock
market, that 5% or 10% works out to a lot less cash. On Friday, the
giant California Public Employees' Retirement System reported that it
lost 5.3% of its assets in February alone, wiping out $9 billion in
value. Barry Gonder, a senior investment officer at CalPERS, said it
seems unlikely that the system's total assets would slide so far that it
would have to cut back on future venture investments. "We're at about
5% [of total assets] today, and I can go as high as 8%," he said. "We'll
probably become more selective." The individual attempts to withdraw
are putting venture capital funds in a delicate position. If they
politely allow cash-crunched limited partners to back out, others who
simply dislike the firms' investment picks might try to follow suit.
"People get caught in the position of do they want to put good money
after bad?" said Brent Nicklas of private equity firm Lexington Partners
in New York. "I've never seen it quite as widespread." Venture capital
partnership agreements typically last seven to 10 years, and the
penalties for early withdrawal can be harsh. In some cases, if an
investor pulls out when the venture capital firm asks for a new round of
promised money, the partner can lose 50% of what it already put in. The
profits that the investor had earned to date also can be rolled over to
satisfy at least part of the obligation. If that's not enough to meet
the capital call, the venture capital firm can sue--an unpleasant step
in a business built largely on personal relationships. The least painful
way out for a desperate limited partner is to sell to another partner
or to dump an unwanted deal on the little-known but growing secondary
market, where a few firms specialize in buying limited partnership
interests. As tax bills come due, an increasing number of limited
partners are doing just that, unloading their holdings for less than 50
cents on the dollar. "We are seeing more sellers than we did six months
ago, but the quality has gone down," said Jerold Newman, president of
secondary buyer Willow Ridge Inc. in New York. Another buyer is
Nicklas' firm, which takes on soured investment deals worth as little as
$1 million--or as much as $1 billion--when a bank or other major
institution decides to sell off an entire portfolio. Many more calls
from individuals are coming into Lexington's Santa Clara office now than
six months ago, Nicklas said. "It's up, and I think it's going to
continue to increase through the end of this year," he said. "A lot of
last year's money came from new entrants into the market, including
high-net-worth individuals at companies that the VCs had backed." A
significant complication for those trying to sell off their investments
is the difficulty in figuring out how much their stakes are worth.
Venture funds often wait until two months after the end of a quarter
before estimating how much their portfolio of public and private
holdings is worth. Those trying to sell now are using valuation
statements from December, before much of the stock slump. The funds also
often use numbers designed to make their returns look the best,
according to Stephen Lisson of InsiderVC.com. It's common for them to
mark up the value of private companies as stocks in similar firms rise,
then decline to mark them down again until forced to do so by an event
such as a takeover or a bankruptcy. And these days, it's impossible to
tell which companies are going to be around in a year. "Valuations are
somewhat irrelevant if the company is going to run out of money,"
Nicklas said. With struggling firms more likely to return to the hand
that fed them for another round of financing, it's up to the venture
capital firms to decide whether their offspring live or die. "How do you
predict or handicap or bet on what the venture guys are going to do?
When you sit down with them, they tell you that even they don't know,"
Nicklas said. As Start-Ups Fail, Venture Investors Back Out in Droves -
Los Angeles Times
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2001/apr/14/business/fi-50936
Steve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin TX | Austin Texas
2014
Steve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin TX | Austin Texas
Steve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin TX | Austin Texas
|
Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin Texas
Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin Texas
PhillyDeals: Pa. pension system shakes
up advisers
Retirement
Pension System
Find More Stories About
Pa. pension data leave questions
about returns
Collections • Retirement
By Joseph N. DiStefano INQUIRER STAFF WRITER
POSTED: October 13, 2005
As pension funds shift more assets to "alternative" investments that
don't trade on stock or bond markets, it's getting harder to tell what
they're really worth - or how big a subsidy they'll need to provide
pensions to future retirees.
For example, take the Pennsylvania Public School Employees'
Retirement System, which, at The Inquirer's request, has disclosed
some of the performance data it uses in estimating its profits from
nearly 100 private-equity and venture-capital funds.
The system has invested about one-tenth of its assets, or $5 billion,
with private-equity and venture-capital firms in the last 10 years.
By the end of last year, the funds had returned about $3 billion of the
total investment, according to the retirement system's annual reports
to pensioners and the General Assembly. More than 70 percent of the fund's private-equity and venture-capital managers - most
of which were hired during the investment boom years of 1997 to 2001 - had yet to pay back the state's investment, let alone
realize any profit.
Yet the retirement system claims total annual returns from these investments of about 6 percent a year since 1999, 8 percent a
year since 2001, and 21 percent in 2004 alone. That is roughly two to three times what the system's U.S. stock investments
returned during those periods, and far above its U.S. stock benchmark, the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 Index. New Jersey is also
considering investing in private equity.
How does the teachers' retirement system - like other buyers and managers of alternative investments - report such positive
numbers? They count not just the cash they actually collect, but also estimated profits from investments that have not yet been
liquidated.
Because no one knows how much those investments in small and often unproven companies will earn, the system relies on
estimates from the outside managers who make the investments; the managers calculate an "internal rate of return" based on
their best guess of what the investments might be worth someday, using, for example, the values of publicly traded companies in
similar industries.
The teachers' pension system is not as big a user of alternative investments as the Pennsylvania State Employees' Retirement
System, which pays pensions to retired state workers. But the teachers' system is more open about the performance of dozens
of managers it hires to handle the funds.
The teachers' system uses a combination of investment profits and subsidies from local school districts, state government, and
deductions from teachers' paychecks to pay pensions to more than 150,000 retired school employees.
The more the retirement systems make from investments, the less they need in subsidies from state taxpayers. For the
teachers' system, local school districts and property-tax-payers help foot the bill. That makes investment performance a matter
of public concern as subsidy levels are calculated each year.
Though it relies on managers' estimates of the value of each alternative investment portfolio and uses them to calculate the
portfolio's overall performance, the teachers' system does not disclose the underlying data in its yearly reports to pensioners
and state legislators.
The system reports assets, payouts and fees, but not each manager's performance - let alone the names of the companies or
properties in which alternative managers invest.
"We don't get many requests" for manager performance data from pension-fund members, and virtually none from legislators,
said Evelyn Tatkovski, spokeswoman for the teachers' retirement system. She added that the system considers not only how
profitable alternative investments may be, but also the benefits of "diversifying our investment portfolio" beyond stocks and
bonds.
But the teachers' system has provided to The Inquirer an estimate of the value of its remaining investments for 78 of its 96
venture-capital and private-equity managers. For 18 others, the system would not provide the estimated value.
In most cases, those 18 investments date to 1999 or earlier, and managers have already sold most of their assets, Tatkovski
said. Still, the teachers' system wants to keep the remaining value confidential because "release of this information would harm
the partnerships by indirectly providing confidential information" on the "small number of properties [or] portfolio companies"
remaining in each fund, she said.
Steve Lisson, publisher of the Texas-based private-equity newsletter InsiderVC.com, questioned the teachers' system's basis for
not disclosing estimated values.
"By that point in a fund's life, the investments are mature and their valuations [are typically] well-known," Lisson said. "They are furiously trying to exit the investment, shopping it and its valuation to any greater fool with a pulse."
Lisson added, "Fund managers love to brag about returns in the good times, and then complain about confidentiality when
they're not performing well."
Tatkovski said the teachers' retirement system kept that data secret partly because it believes that is a good policy, and partly
because some investment managers ask it to do so.
Among the remaining estimated investment values that the system will not release, some are from funds that made money during
the bull-market years of the 1990s. Edison Venture Partners, of Princeton, has returned more than $52 million from investments
in 1991 and 1994 that totaled $25 million. TL Ventures, of Wayne, turned $60 million, invested in 1992 and 1997, into a total of
$83 million in cash. The teachers' system will not say what either firm's remaining investments are worth.
Other investments whose current value the teachers' system will not disclose have so far been money-losers. The teachers put
$56 million into investment firm Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin's Sunrise Investment Partnership in 1998, but had only $5
million to show for it at the end of last year. The system put $180 million into Deutsche European Partners IV in 1999, and was
still $44 million short of showing a profit as of Dec. 31.
The teachers' system also provided estimates of the value of investments held by 25 real estate funds, withholding the
information for certain funds managed by Lazard Freres Real Estate Investors and Whitehall Street Real Estate Funds.
The system says its overall real estate portfolio, which equals around 5 percent of its total assets (not counting real estate
investment trusts, which trade on the stock market), has been more profitable than any other asset class in the last five years,
returning an average of more than 12 percent, and rising to 25 percent in 2004.
Last year, the two systems paid a total of $386 million to more than 300 private firms that manage state investments. Of that
total, $260 million was paid to managers of private equity, venture capital, real estate, hedge funds (at the state employees'
system), and other alternative-investment managers, which accounted for less than one-third of the systems' combined
investments.
Contact staff writer Joseph N. DiStefano at 215-843-4947 or jdistefano@phillynews.com.
Pa. pension data leave questions about returns - Philly.com http://articles.philly.com/2005-10-13/business/25443104_1_pension-syst...
2 of 2
Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin Texas
PhillyDeals: Pa. pension system shakes
up advisers
Retirement
Pension System
Find More Stories About
Pa. pension data leave questions
about returns
Collections • Retirement
By Joseph N. DiStefano INQUIRER STAFF WRITER
POSTED: October 13, 2005
As pension funds shift more assets to "alternative" investments that
don't trade on stock or bond markets, it's getting harder to tell what
they're really worth - or how big a subsidy they'll need to provide
pensions to future retirees.
For example, take the Pennsylvania Public School Employees'
Retirement System, which, at The Inquirer's request, has disclosed
some of the performance data it uses in estimating its profits from
nearly 100 private-equity and venture-capital funds.
The system has invested about one-tenth of its assets, or $5 billion,
with private-equity and venture-capital firms in the last 10 years.
By the end of last year, the funds had returned about $3 billion of the
total investment, according to the retirement system's annual reports
to pensioners and the General Assembly. More than 70 percent of the fund's private-equity and venture-capital managers - most
of which were hired during the investment boom years of 1997 to 2001 - had yet to pay back the state's investment, let alone
realize any profit.
Yet the retirement system claims total annual returns from these investments of about 6 percent a year since 1999, 8 percent a
year since 2001, and 21 percent in 2004 alone. That is roughly two to three times what the system's U.S. stock investments
returned during those periods, and far above its U.S. stock benchmark, the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 Index. New Jersey is also
considering investing in private equity.
How does the teachers' retirement system - like other buyers and managers of alternative investments - report such positive
numbers? They count not just the cash they actually collect, but also estimated profits from investments that have not yet been
liquidated.
Because no one knows how much those investments in small and often unproven companies will earn, the system relies on
estimates from the outside managers who make the investments; the managers calculate an "internal rate of return" based on
their best guess of what the investments might be worth someday, using, for example, the values of publicly traded companies in
similar industries.
The teachers' pension system is not as big a user of alternative investments as the Pennsylvania State Employees' Retirement
System, which pays pensions to retired state workers. But the teachers' system is more open about the performance of dozens
of managers it hires to handle the funds.
The teachers' system uses a combination of investment profits and subsidies from local school districts, state government, and
deductions from teachers' paychecks to pay pensions to more than 150,000 retired school employees.
The more the retirement systems make from investments, the less they need in subsidies from state taxpayers. For the
teachers' system, local school districts and property-tax-payers help foot the bill. That makes investment performance a matter
of public concern as subsidy levels are calculated each year.
Though it relies on managers' estimates of the value of each alternative investment portfolio and uses them to calculate the
portfolio's overall performance, the teachers' system does not disclose the underlying data in its yearly reports to pensioners
and state legislators.
The system reports assets, payouts and fees, but not each manager's performance - let alone the names of the companies or
properties in which alternative managers invest.
"We don't get many requests" for manager performance data from pension-fund members, and virtually none from legislators,
said Evelyn Tatkovski, spokeswoman for the teachers' retirement system. She added that the system considers not only how
profitable alternative investments may be, but also the benefits of "diversifying our investment portfolio" beyond stocks and
bonds.
But the teachers' system has provided to The Inquirer an estimate of the value of its remaining investments for 78 of its 96
venture-capital and private-equity managers. For 18 others, the system would not provide the estimated value.
In most cases, those 18 investments date to 1999 or earlier, and managers have already sold most of their assets, Tatkovski
said. Still, the teachers' system wants to keep the remaining value confidential because "release of this information would harm
the partnerships by indirectly providing confidential information" on the "small number of properties [or] portfolio companies"
remaining in each fund, she said.
Steve Lisson, publisher of the Texas-based private-equity newsletter InsiderVC.com, questioned the teachers' system's basis for
not disclosing estimated values.
"By that point in a fund's life, the investments are mature and their valuations [are typically] well-known," Lisson said. "They are furiously trying to exit the investment, shopping it and its valuation to any greater fool with a pulse."
Lisson added, "Fund managers love to brag about returns in the good times, and then complain about confidentiality when
they're not performing well."
Tatkovski said the teachers' retirement system kept that data secret partly because it believes that is a good policy, and partly
because some investment managers ask it to do so.
Among the remaining estimated investment values that the system will not release, some are from funds that made money during
the bull-market years of the 1990s. Edison Venture Partners, of Princeton, has returned more than $52 million from investments
in 1991 and 1994 that totaled $25 million. TL Ventures, of Wayne, turned $60 million, invested in 1992 and 1997, into a total of
$83 million in cash. The teachers' system will not say what either firm's remaining investments are worth.
Other investments whose current value the teachers' system will not disclose have so far been money-losers. The teachers put
$56 million into investment firm Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin's Sunrise Investment Partnership in 1998, but had only $5
million to show for it at the end of last year. The system put $180 million into Deutsche European Partners IV in 1999, and was
still $44 million short of showing a profit as of Dec. 31.
The teachers' system also provided estimates of the value of investments held by 25 real estate funds, withholding the
information for certain funds managed by Lazard Freres Real Estate Investors and Whitehall Street Real Estate Funds.
The system says its overall real estate portfolio, which equals around 5 percent of its total assets (not counting real estate
investment trusts, which trade on the stock market), has been more profitable than any other asset class in the last five years,
returning an average of more than 12 percent, and rising to 25 percent in 2004.
Last year, the two systems paid a total of $386 million to more than 300 private firms that manage state investments. Of that
total, $260 million was paid to managers of private equity, venture capital, real estate, hedge funds (at the state employees'
system), and other alternative-investment managers, which accounted for less than one-third of the systems' combined
investments.
Contact staff writer Joseph N. DiStefano at 215-843-4947 or jdistefano@phillynews.com.
Pa. pension data leave questions about returns - Philly.com http://articles.philly.com/2005-10-13/business/25443104_1_pension-syst...
2 of 2
Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin Texas
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Pa. pension system shakes up advisers Retirement Pension System
Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin Texas
2014
Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin Texas
PhillyDeals: Pa. pension system shakes
up advisers
Retirement
Pension System
Find More Stories About
Pa. pension data leave questions
about returns
Collections • Retirement
By Joseph N. DiStefano INQUIRER STAFF WRITER
POSTED: October 13, 2005
As pension funds shift more assets to "alternative" investments that
don't trade on stock or bond markets, it's getting harder to tell what
they're really worth - or how big a subsidy they'll need to provide
pensions to future retirees.
For example, take the Pennsylvania Public School Employees'
Retirement System, which, at The Inquirer's request, has disclosed
some of the performance data it uses in estimating its profits from
nearly 100 private-equity and venture-capital funds.
The system has invested about one-tenth of its assets, or $5 billion,
with private-equity and venture-capital firms in the last 10 years.
By the end of last year, the funds had returned about $3 billion of the
total investment, according to the retirement system's annual reports
to pensioners and the General Assembly. More than 70 percent of the fund's private-equity and venture-capital managers - most
of which were hired during the investment boom years of 1997 to 2001 - had yet to pay back the state's investment, let alone
realize any profit.
Yet the retirement system claims total annual returns from these investments of about 6 percent a year since 1999, 8 percent a
year since 2001, and 21 percent in 2004 alone. That is roughly two to three times what the system's U.S. stock investments
returned during those periods, and far above its U.S. stock benchmark, the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 Index. New Jersey is also
considering investing in private equity.
How does the teachers' retirement system - like other buyers and managers of alternative investments - report such positive
numbers? They count not just the cash they actually collect, but also estimated profits from investments that have not yet been
liquidated.
Because no one knows how much those investments in small and often unproven companies will earn, the system relies on
estimates from the outside managers who make the investments; the managers calculate an "internal rate of return" based on
their best guess of what the investments might be worth someday, using, for example, the values of publicly traded companies in
similar industries.
The teachers' pension system is not as big a user of alternative investments as the Pennsylvania State Employees' Retirement
System, which pays pensions to retired state workers. But the teachers' system is more open about the performance of dozens
of managers it hires to handle the funds.
The teachers' system uses a combination of investment profits and subsidies from local school districts, state government, and
deductions from teachers' paychecks to pay pensions to more than 150,000 retired school employees.
The more the retirement systems make from investments, the less they need in subsidies from state taxpayers. For the
teachers' system, local school districts and property-tax-payers help foot the bill. That makes investment performance a matter
of public concern as subsidy levels are calculated each year.
Though it relies on managers' estimates of the value of each alternative investment portfolio and uses them to calculate the
portfolio's overall performance, the teachers' system does not disclose the underlying data in its yearly reports to pensioners
and state legislators.
The system reports assets, payouts and fees, but not each manager's performance - let alone the names of the companies or
properties in which alternative managers invest.
"We don't get many requests" for manager performance data from pension-fund members, and virtually none from legislators,
said Evelyn Tatkovski, spokeswoman for the teachers' retirement system. She added that the system considers not only how
profitable alternative investments may be, but also the benefits of "diversifying our investment portfolio" beyond stocks and
bonds.
But the teachers' system has provided to The Inquirer an estimate of the value of its remaining investments for 78 of its 96
venture-capital and private-equity managers. For 18 others, the system would not provide the estimated value.
In most cases, those 18 investments date to 1999 or earlier, and managers have already sold most of their assets, Tatkovski
said. Still, the teachers' system wants to keep the remaining value confidential because "release of this information would harm
the partnerships by indirectly providing confidential information" on the "small number of properties [or] portfolio companies"
remaining in each fund, she said.
Steve Lisson, publisher of the Texas-based private-equity newsletter InsiderVC.com, questioned the teachers' system's basis for
not disclosing estimated values.
"By that point in a fund's life, the investments are mature and their valuations [are typically] well-known," Lisson said. "They are furiously trying to exit the investment, shopping it and its valuation to any greater fool with a pulse."
Lisson added, "Fund managers love to brag about returns in the good times, and then complain about confidentiality when
they're not performing well."
Tatkovski said the teachers' retirement system kept that data secret partly because it believes that is a good policy, and partly
because some investment managers ask it to do so.
Among the remaining estimated investment values that the system will not release, some are from funds that made money during
the bull-market years of the 1990s. Edison Venture Partners, of Princeton, has returned more than $52 million from investments
in 1991 and 1994 that totaled $25 million. TL Ventures, of Wayne, turned $60 million, invested in 1992 and 1997, into a total of
$83 million in cash. The teachers' system will not say what either firm's remaining investments are worth.
Other investments whose current value the teachers' system will not disclose have so far been money-losers. The teachers put
$56 million into investment firm Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin's Sunrise Investment Partnership in 1998, but had only $5
million to show for it at the end of last year. The system put $180 million into Deutsche European Partners IV in 1999, and was
still $44 million short of showing a profit as of Dec. 31.
The teachers' system also provided estimates of the value of investments held by 25 real estate funds, withholding the
information for certain funds managed by Lazard Freres Real Estate Investors and Whitehall Street Real Estate Funds.
The system says its overall real estate portfolio, which equals around 5 percent of its total assets (not counting real estate
investment trusts, which trade on the stock market), has been more profitable than any other asset class in the last five years,
returning an average of more than 12 percent, and rising to 25 percent in 2004.
Last year, the two systems paid a total of $386 million to more than 300 private firms that manage state investments. Of that
total, $260 million was paid to managers of private equity, venture capital, real estate, hedge funds (at the state employees'
system), and other alternative-investment managers, which accounted for less than one-third of the systems' combined
investments.
Contact staff writer Joseph N. DiStefano at 215-843-4947 or jdistefano@phillynews.com.
Pa. pension data leave questions about returns - Philly.com http://articles.philly.com/2005-10-13/business/25443104_1_pension-syst...
2 of 2
Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin Texas
PhillyDeals: Pa. pension system shakes
up advisers
Retirement
Pension System
Find More Stories About
Pa. pension data leave questions
about returns
Collections • Retirement
By Joseph N. DiStefano INQUIRER STAFF WRITER
POSTED: October 13, 2005
As pension funds shift more assets to "alternative" investments that
don't trade on stock or bond markets, it's getting harder to tell what
they're really worth - or how big a subsidy they'll need to provide
pensions to future retirees.
For example, take the Pennsylvania Public School Employees'
Retirement System, which, at The Inquirer's request, has disclosed
some of the performance data it uses in estimating its profits from
nearly 100 private-equity and venture-capital funds.
The system has invested about one-tenth of its assets, or $5 billion,
with private-equity and venture-capital firms in the last 10 years.
By the end of last year, the funds had returned about $3 billion of the
total investment, according to the retirement system's annual reports
to pensioners and the General Assembly. More than 70 percent of the fund's private-equity and venture-capital managers - most
of which were hired during the investment boom years of 1997 to 2001 - had yet to pay back the state's investment, let alone
realize any profit.
Yet the retirement system claims total annual returns from these investments of about 6 percent a year since 1999, 8 percent a
year since 2001, and 21 percent in 2004 alone. That is roughly two to three times what the system's U.S. stock investments
returned during those periods, and far above its U.S. stock benchmark, the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 Index. New Jersey is also
considering investing in private equity.
How does the teachers' retirement system - like other buyers and managers of alternative investments - report such positive
numbers? They count not just the cash they actually collect, but also estimated profits from investments that have not yet been
liquidated.
Because no one knows how much those investments in small and often unproven companies will earn, the system relies on
estimates from the outside managers who make the investments; the managers calculate an "internal rate of return" based on
their best guess of what the investments might be worth someday, using, for example, the values of publicly traded companies in
similar industries.
The teachers' pension system is not as big a user of alternative investments as the Pennsylvania State Employees' Retirement
System, which pays pensions to retired state workers. But the teachers' system is more open about the performance of dozens
of managers it hires to handle the funds.
The teachers' system uses a combination of investment profits and subsidies from local school districts, state government, and
deductions from teachers' paychecks to pay pensions to more than 150,000 retired school employees.
The more the retirement systems make from investments, the less they need in subsidies from state taxpayers. For the
teachers' system, local school districts and property-tax-payers help foot the bill. That makes investment performance a matter
of public concern as subsidy levels are calculated each year.
Though it relies on managers' estimates of the value of each alternative investment portfolio and uses them to calculate the
portfolio's overall performance, the teachers' system does not disclose the underlying data in its yearly reports to pensioners
and state legislators.
The system reports assets, payouts and fees, but not each manager's performance - let alone the names of the companies or
properties in which alternative managers invest.
"We don't get many requests" for manager performance data from pension-fund members, and virtually none from legislators,
said Evelyn Tatkovski, spokeswoman for the teachers' retirement system. She added that the system considers not only how
profitable alternative investments may be, but also the benefits of "diversifying our investment portfolio" beyond stocks and
bonds.
But the teachers' system has provided to The Inquirer an estimate of the value of its remaining investments for 78 of its 96
venture-capital and private-equity managers. For 18 others, the system would not provide the estimated value.
In most cases, those 18 investments date to 1999 or earlier, and managers have already sold most of their assets, Tatkovski
said. Still, the teachers' system wants to keep the remaining value confidential because "release of this information would harm
the partnerships by indirectly providing confidential information" on the "small number of properties [or] portfolio companies"
remaining in each fund, she said.
Steve Lisson, publisher of the Texas-based private-equity newsletter InsiderVC.com, questioned the teachers' system's basis for
not disclosing estimated values.
"By that point in a fund's life, the investments are mature and their valuations [are typically] well-known," Lisson said. "They are furiously trying to exit the investment, shopping it and its valuation to any greater fool with a pulse."
Lisson added, "Fund managers love to brag about returns in the good times, and then complain about confidentiality when
they're not performing well."
Tatkovski said the teachers' retirement system kept that data secret partly because it believes that is a good policy, and partly
because some investment managers ask it to do so.
Among the remaining estimated investment values that the system will not release, some are from funds that made money during
the bull-market years of the 1990s. Edison Venture Partners, of Princeton, has returned more than $52 million from investments
in 1991 and 1994 that totaled $25 million. TL Ventures, of Wayne, turned $60 million, invested in 1992 and 1997, into a total of
$83 million in cash. The teachers' system will not say what either firm's remaining investments are worth.
Other investments whose current value the teachers' system will not disclose have so far been money-losers. The teachers put
$56 million into investment firm Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin's Sunrise Investment Partnership in 1998, but had only $5
million to show for it at the end of last year. The system put $180 million into Deutsche European Partners IV in 1999, and was
still $44 million short of showing a profit as of Dec. 31.
The teachers' system also provided estimates of the value of investments held by 25 real estate funds, withholding the
information for certain funds managed by Lazard Freres Real Estate Investors and Whitehall Street Real Estate Funds.
The system says its overall real estate portfolio, which equals around 5 percent of its total assets (not counting real estate
investment trusts, which trade on the stock market), has been more profitable than any other asset class in the last five years,
returning an average of more than 12 percent, and rising to 25 percent in 2004.
Last year, the two systems paid a total of $386 million to more than 300 private firms that manage state investments. Of that
total, $260 million was paid to managers of private equity, venture capital, real estate, hedge funds (at the state employees'
system), and other alternative-investment managers, which accounted for less than one-third of the systems' combined
investments.
Contact staff writer Joseph N. DiStefano at 215-843-4947 or jdistefano@phillynews.com.
Pa. pension data leave questions about returns - Philly.com http://articles.philly.com/2005-10-13/business/25443104_1_pension-syst...
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LISSON, STEVE
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LISSON STEVE
LISSON STEVE
- Menn,J. All the Rave. 2003 (218, 319)
Lisson v. ING GROEP N.V. | Stephen N. Lisson Austin TX
Washington Post | Steve Lisson | Stephen N. Lisson | New Enterprise Is Huge and Proud of It
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New Enterprise Is Huge and Proud of It
By Terence O’Hara
Monday, December 6, 2004; Page E01
Peter J. Barris runs the biggest stand-alone venture capital operation in the world.
His firm, New Enterprise Associates, sailed through 2002-03, the nuclear winter
of venture investing, with relative ease. Nearly every technology entrepreneur worth
his salt would put NEA near the top of his list of firms he’d most like to raise money
from.
Yet Barris and other longtime NEA partners continue to hear criticism from within
their industry that NEA’s girth is a handicap, that NEA has strayed from the one true
swashbuckling venture capital faith and become –institutional.
Barris has heard this criticism –that NEA is too big and spread out to create the
home-run investments that put managers of NEA’s more romantic, smaller rivals on
the cover of business magazines. He has a well-practiced response.
“I understand the question, or the criticism, at a philosophical level,” Barris said last
week. “But the empirical data don’t support it. The numbers don’t lie.”
Barris, who is based in Reston, became the Baltimore firm’s sole managing general
partner in 1999 after serving three years as part of a management troika. Since then,
NEA has indeed performed better than the vast majority of venture capital firms,
although not at the level of the highest-performing firms that manage much smaller
amounts of money.
“I would argue that size is an advantage,” he said. “We have a superior network of
entrepreneurs that have done business with us for years. We have the capital to see
an investment all the way through. We have the domain knowledge to match any
fund. And we have a presence on both coasts.”
“And,” he said, “we perform.”
NEA has 11 venture funds, three of them raised since 1999. None of the three funds was in the black at
mid-year. According to the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (Calpers), which invested in the
1999 fund NEA IX and 2000′s NEA X, those funds had an annualized internal rate of return of minus 24
percent and minus 0.9 percent, respectively, on June 30. Those numbers may not prove much, however: It’s a rare fund from those years that has a positive return, and there is ample time in which to realize a profit,
which could be substantial. It takes up to 10 years to determine a venture fund’s final rate of return.
NEA IX is far and away NEA’s worst performer. “Not our most proud fund,” Barris said. NEA IX had 90
percent of its capital in technology firms, mostly telecom-related investments, Barris said. For early-stage
1999 funds like NEA IX, break-even is considered excellent.
NEA X, the firm’ s biggest, is performing substantially better than 75 percent of all other funds raised in 2000.
Barris said that since June 30, it has moved into positive territory.
Discussions with NEA limited partners –institutions and rich people who invest in NEA’s funds –and others in the industry who follow NEA closely reveal a common theme: NEA has become a better-than-average
venture shop, and is now big enough so that description means real money. On average, its portfolio
companies have a better chance of returning money to NEA’s investors than portfolio companies of other
firms. On average, it’s as good a bet as any for an investor who wants to play in venture capital. And for
institutional investors such as Calpers and other big money managers, that’s as good as it gets. They’ve thrown money at NEA in the past four years.
“Their structure enables them to handle large amounts of money,” said Edward J. Mathias, a managing
director in Carlyle Group’s venture capital business who helped NEA’s founders when they started the firm
in 1978. “An institutional investor wanting to invest $25 million can do so with NEA with some assurance
that they can have above-average –not hugely above-average –but above-average returns. They have a high batting average. They hit a lot of doubles instead of a few home runs.”
That may sound like feint praise, but Mathias is a staunch admirer of NEA and its people. Hitting a lot of
doubles in venture capital is no easy feat, he said.
Not everyone is as big a fan. Steve Lisson, the editor of InsiderVC.com, takes a dim view of NEA’s size.
“Larger funds can’t produce the kinds of returns of smaller funds,” said Lisson, whose company provides
analysis of and statistics on venture fund performance and management practices. “Returns vary inversely
with money under management, because the larger the fund, the less impact one monster hit will have on its
performance.”
NEA X is the largest VC fund ever. It raised $2.3 billion from its limited partners in 2000. The firm’s latest
fund, NEA XI, stopped raising money a year ago at $1.1 billion. Most of the largest non-NEA early-stage
venture funds max out at $350 million, and some more prominent venture capital firms would not know what
to do with that much. Novak Biddle Venture Partners, a Bethesda firm that has probably had the most
successful run of any local venture firm in 2004, raised a $150 million fund this year, then turned investors
away. Novak Biddle Partners III, a relatively small fund raised at roughly the same time as NEA X, was up
about 6 percent as of Sept. 30.
Managers of funds the size of NEA’s, Lisson said, inevitably have to do more later-stage and follow-on deals
because the universe of the best early-stage deals, which provide the biggest risk-return, is necessarily finite.
The most profitable funds are the ones that focus solely on the earliest-stage companies, and spend lots of
time and money on those companies at their birth, Lisson said. If NEA invested all of the $1.1 billion in NEA
XI in such small, time-consuming investments, it would need a heck of a lot more people than the 37
partners, venture partners and principals it has now.
To take an extreme example, think of Google Inc., whose early venture backers made billions of dollars when the company went public this year. NEA has financed more than 370 companies, and has a lot of big winners
in its huge portfolio, but none would compare with Google.
Barris disputes the notion that NEA is forced to do more later-stage, less-profitable deals. “As our funds have increased in size, the percentage of early-stage, start-up deals as a percent of our total has grown, not shrunk,” he said.
Institutional investors are more than comfortable putting money into NEA. Its performance, they say, is not
tied to one deal, and the firm’s track record over more than two decades speaks for itself. NEA’s first eight
funds, the last of which closed in 1998, have made huge amounts of money. NEA VIII, a $560 million fund,
earned an annualized internal rate of return of 168 percent.
Barris said NEA’s cost structure is distinctive in several ways. Most venture capital fund managers charge a percentage of the fund’s size to cover their expenses, typically 2 percent of a fund’s capital. NEA doesn’t do
that; instead, it a budget of expenses expected to cover the costs of running the fund, including salaries, that
are then approved by a representative board of limited partners. For a large fund, that sharply reduces the
costs to the limited partners.
“Limited partners love this,” Mathias said.
Calpers, one of the most active investors in private equity funds, committed $75 million to NEA X, one of the 10 largest investments it has made in a single venture fund.
Most venture funds split the profits of a fund, the most typical split being 80 percent going to limited partners
and 20 percent going to the fund’s managers. NEA, Barris said, makes the split 70-30.
Inside the firm, profits from a deal are spread out across the partnership; no one partner takes more than
another in a single deal. That promotes a team atmosphere that is necessary in running a big fund, Barris said.
In most funds, a partner who leads a successful deal gets a bigger cut of the profits than other partners.
The result, Mathias said, is less the amalgam of egotists seen at many venture capital firms than a consortium
of super-smart people trying to make a lot of money. “It’s not a superstar kind of firm,” he said.
Although NEA has more money under management than any other stand-alone venture capital firm –some
Wall Street private equity firms that do venture investing have bigger funds, but tend to engage as well in
leveraged buyouts and hedge investing –Barris said there’s no prospect for his firm becoming dominant in
the venture capital world.
“The industry has just gotten more competitive, not less,” Barris said. “Even with our huge funds, we still
have only 2 percent of the total amount of VC funds under management. In this business, it’s not who has the
most money but who has the most expertise that matters.”
And is NEA an “institution,” that staid word that makes many small venture capital firms shudder?
“I don’t know what the definition of institutional is,” Barris said. “I think we’ve gone farther than most firms
in institutionalizing what has been a cottage industry. We employ some professional management techniques
and policies. But because we started the firm on both coasts, we’ve had those things from the beginning. So I
don’t think we’ve changed much as we’ve gotten bigger.”
Terence O’Hara’s e-mail address is oharat@washpost.com.
© 2004 The Washington Post Company
Steve Lisson Austin TX Stephen N. Lisson Austin TX Steve Lisson Austin Texas Stephen N. Lisson Austin Texas
New Enterprise Is Huge and Proud of It
By Terence O’Hara
Monday, December 6, 2004; Page E01
Peter J. Barris runs the biggest stand-alone venture capital operation in the world.
His firm, New Enterprise Associates, sailed through 2002-03, the nuclear winter
of venture investing, with relative ease. Nearly every technology entrepreneur worth
his salt would put NEA near the top of his list of firms he’d most like to raise money
from.
Yet Barris and other longtime NEA partners continue to hear criticism from within
their industry that NEA’s girth is a handicap, that NEA has strayed from the one true
swashbuckling venture capital faith and become –institutional.
Barris has heard this criticism –that NEA is too big and spread out to create the
home-run investments that put managers of NEA’s more romantic, smaller rivals on
the cover of business magazines. He has a well-practiced response.
“I understand the question, or the criticism, at a philosophical level,” Barris said last
week. “But the empirical data don’t support it. The numbers don’t lie.”
Barris, who is based in Reston, became the Baltimore firm’s sole managing general
partner in 1999 after serving three years as part of a management troika. Since then,
NEA has indeed performed better than the vast majority of venture capital firms,
although not at the level of the highest-performing firms that manage much smaller
amounts of money.
“I would argue that size is an advantage,” he said. “We have a superior network of
entrepreneurs that have done business with us for years. We have the capital to see
an investment all the way through. We have the domain knowledge to match any
fund. And we have a presence on both coasts.”
“And,” he said, “we perform.”
NEA has 11 venture funds, three of them raised since 1999. None of the three funds was in the black at
mid-year. According to the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (Calpers), which invested in the
1999 fund NEA IX and 2000′s NEA X, those funds had an annualized internal rate of return of minus 24
percent and minus 0.9 percent, respectively, on June 30. Those numbers may not prove much, however: It’s a rare fund from those years that has a positive return, and there is ample time in which to realize a profit,
which could be substantial. It takes up to 10 years to determine a venture fund’s final rate of return.
NEA IX is far and away NEA’s worst performer. “Not our most proud fund,” Barris said. NEA IX had 90
percent of its capital in technology firms, mostly telecom-related investments, Barris said. For early-stage
1999 funds like NEA IX, break-even is considered excellent.
NEA X, the firm’ s biggest, is performing substantially better than 75 percent of all other funds raised in 2000.
Barris said that since June 30, it has moved into positive territory.
Discussions with NEA limited partners –institutions and rich people who invest in NEA’s funds –and others in the industry who follow NEA closely reveal a common theme: NEA has become a better-than-average
venture shop, and is now big enough so that description means real money. On average, its portfolio
companies have a better chance of returning money to NEA’s investors than portfolio companies of other
firms. On average, it’s as good a bet as any for an investor who wants to play in venture capital. And for
institutional investors such as Calpers and other big money managers, that’s as good as it gets. They’ve thrown money at NEA in the past four years.
“Their structure enables them to handle large amounts of money,” said Edward J. Mathias, a managing
director in Carlyle Group’s venture capital business who helped NEA’s founders when they started the firm
in 1978. “An institutional investor wanting to invest $25 million can do so with NEA with some assurance
that they can have above-average –not hugely above-average –but above-average returns. They have a high batting average. They hit a lot of doubles instead of a few home runs.”
That may sound like feint praise, but Mathias is a staunch admirer of NEA and its people. Hitting a lot of
doubles in venture capital is no easy feat, he said.
Not everyone is as big a fan. Steve Lisson, the editor of InsiderVC.com, takes a dim view of NEA’s size.
“Larger funds can’t produce the kinds of returns of smaller funds,” said Lisson, whose company provides
analysis of and statistics on venture fund performance and management practices. “Returns vary inversely
with money under management, because the larger the fund, the less impact one monster hit will have on its
performance.”
NEA X is the largest VC fund ever. It raised $2.3 billion from its limited partners in 2000. The firm’s latest
fund, NEA XI, stopped raising money a year ago at $1.1 billion. Most of the largest non-NEA early-stage
venture funds max out at $350 million, and some more prominent venture capital firms would not know what
to do with that much. Novak Biddle Venture Partners, a Bethesda firm that has probably had the most
successful run of any local venture firm in 2004, raised a $150 million fund this year, then turned investors
away. Novak Biddle Partners III, a relatively small fund raised at roughly the same time as NEA X, was up
about 6 percent as of Sept. 30.
Managers of funds the size of NEA’s, Lisson said, inevitably have to do more later-stage and follow-on deals
because the universe of the best early-stage deals, which provide the biggest risk-return, is necessarily finite.
The most profitable funds are the ones that focus solely on the earliest-stage companies, and spend lots of
time and money on those companies at their birth, Lisson said. If NEA invested all of the $1.1 billion in NEA
XI in such small, time-consuming investments, it would need a heck of a lot more people than the 37
partners, venture partners and principals it has now.
To take an extreme example, think of Google Inc., whose early venture backers made billions of dollars when the company went public this year. NEA has financed more than 370 companies, and has a lot of big winners
in its huge portfolio, but none would compare with Google.
Barris disputes the notion that NEA is forced to do more later-stage, less-profitable deals. “As our funds have increased in size, the percentage of early-stage, start-up deals as a percent of our total has grown, not shrunk,” he said.
Institutional investors are more than comfortable putting money into NEA. Its performance, they say, is not
tied to one deal, and the firm’s track record over more than two decades speaks for itself. NEA’s first eight
funds, the last of which closed in 1998, have made huge amounts of money. NEA VIII, a $560 million fund,
earned an annualized internal rate of return of 168 percent.
Barris said NEA’s cost structure is distinctive in several ways. Most venture capital fund managers charge a percentage of the fund’s size to cover their expenses, typically 2 percent of a fund’s capital. NEA doesn’t do
that; instead, it a budget of expenses expected to cover the costs of running the fund, including salaries, that
are then approved by a representative board of limited partners. For a large fund, that sharply reduces the
costs to the limited partners.
“Limited partners love this,” Mathias said.
Calpers, one of the most active investors in private equity funds, committed $75 million to NEA X, one of the 10 largest investments it has made in a single venture fund.
Most venture funds split the profits of a fund, the most typical split being 80 percent going to limited partners
and 20 percent going to the fund’s managers. NEA, Barris said, makes the split 70-30.
Inside the firm, profits from a deal are spread out across the partnership; no one partner takes more than
another in a single deal. That promotes a team atmosphere that is necessary in running a big fund, Barris said.
In most funds, a partner who leads a successful deal gets a bigger cut of the profits than other partners.
The result, Mathias said, is less the amalgam of egotists seen at many venture capital firms than a consortium
of super-smart people trying to make a lot of money. “It’s not a superstar kind of firm,” he said.
Although NEA has more money under management than any other stand-alone venture capital firm –some
Wall Street private equity firms that do venture investing have bigger funds, but tend to engage as well in
leveraged buyouts and hedge investing –Barris said there’s no prospect for his firm becoming dominant in
the venture capital world.
“The industry has just gotten more competitive, not less,” Barris said. “Even with our huge funds, we still
have only 2 percent of the total amount of VC funds under management. In this business, it’s not who has the
most money but who has the most expertise that matters.”
And is NEA an “institution,” that staid word that makes many small venture capital firms shudder?
“I don’t know what the definition of institutional is,” Barris said. “I think we’ve gone farther than most firms
in institutionalizing what has been a cottage industry. We employ some professional management techniques
and policies. But because we started the firm on both coasts, we’ve had those things from the beginning. So I
don’t think we’ve changed much as we’ve gotten bigger.”
Terence O’Hara’s e-mail address is oharat@washpost.com.
© 2004 The Washington Post Company
Steve Lisson Austin TX Stephen N. Lisson Austin TX Steve Lisson Austin Texas Stephen N. Lisson Austin Texas
Friday, November 29, 2013
Barron’s
Steve Lisson Austin TX Stephen N. Lisson Austin TX Steve Lisson Austin Texas Stephen N. Lisson Austin Texas
Steve Lisson Austin TX Stephen N. Lisson Austin TX Steve Lisson Austin Texas Stephen N. Lisson Austin Texas Steve Lisson Austin TX Stephen N. Lisson Austin TX Steve Lisson Austin Texas Stephen N. Lisson Austin TexasWhat Goes Up:
After soaring, this year’s IPOs have returned to earth
By Jack Willoughby
12/11/2000
Barron’s
Page 35
(Copyright (c) 2000, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.)
Much of the cleanup remains to be done. Many famous venture capital firms are stuck with huge amounts of devalued stock. “Most of those triple-digit returns that venture-capital firms are so fond of reporting will never materialize because they are not based on reality,” contends Stephen N. (Steve) Lisson, Austin-based editor of InsiderVC.com, which tracks performance. “Sure, the dot.com fallout has been gruesome, but much of its effect still remains hidden. Even today many VC funds are still reluctant to write down their investments because they want to keep attracting new capital.”
Matrix Edges Kleiner
So compliments paid, we set out to find out which was better.
Using the data of Steve Lisson, editor of InsiderVC.com, who tracks VCs’ performance and considers Matrix and Kleiner the top VCs, we applied a metric suggested by former Flatiron partner Dan Malven, which we will call the “Malven Metric.”
Malven suggested the metric after our piece comparing Kleiner’s performance in the IPO market last year with four other firms. In short, we divide overall performance by the number of partners, thus measuring wealth created per partner.
Malven cautions that that measure of performance could be skewed if each partner at one firm has a lot more to invest than partners at another firm, but Kleiner and Matrix appear pretty evenly matched. Matrix IV in 1995 was a $125 million fund (and had distributed 11 times that amount to its limited partners by the middle of last year, according to Lisson), and Matrix V in 1998 was a $200 million fund that had already distributed four times its LPs’ capital by mid-2000. Using the conservative figure of five partners during the time that 2000 IPOs were being funded, that means Matrix partners had $65 million each to work with. (We did not include Matrix VI, a $304 million fund that was only 30% invested as of June 30 last year.)
Kleiner VIII in 1996 was a $299 million fund that had returned 12 times its LPs’ capital by mid-2000, according to Lisson. Kleiner IX in 1999 was a $460 million fund that was 80% invested by mid-2000. Using the conservative figure of 13 partners, Kleiner partners had $58 million each to work with.
Now on to the 2000 results. Ten of Kleiner’s companies went public in 2000 (0.77 IPO per partner), compared to 4 for Matrix (0.80 IPO per partner). Kleiner’s stake in those companies was worth about $2.3 billion when the lock-up period expired (one company, Cosine Communications, is still in lock-up, and Kleiner’s stake in the company is worth about $100 million). Matrix’s stake in its four IPOs was worth about $1.6 billion when they came out of lock-up. That gives Matrix a per-partner return of $320 million, and Kleiner $177 million, giving the edge in per-partner wealth creation to Matrix.
A few caveats on those results. First, we measured performance in the IPO market only; we did not look at acquisitions, the number of which often exceeds IPOs in a given year. Second, Kleiner has two health care partners, according to Malven. Since health care companies had a tough year in the IPO market last year (Kleiner had no health care IPOs), reporting the results based on IT partners only raises Kleiner’s per-partner wealth creation to $209 million. We certainly want our top VCs to focus on the future of health care regardless of market conditions, and there’s been quite a debate going on within the venture capital industry about IT versus health care investing. The third caveat is that Kleiner IX is the newest of the funds measured, so that too could give Matrix an edge. But don’t feel too bad for Kleiner; according to Lisson, 6-year-old Kleiner VII was the best-performing venture fund last year, still riding high on its monster hit Juniper Networks (NASDAQ:JNPR). That fund has returned more than 20 times its limited partners’ capital.
Matrix’s big hit of 2000 was Arrowpoint Communications, which netted Matrix $1 billion when it was acquired by Cisco (Nasdaq:CSCO) in June. Kleiner had holdings in three IPOs that were worth $500 million or more when they came out of lock up: ONI Systems (Nasdaq:ONIS), Handspring (Nasdaq:HAND) and Corvis (Nasdaq:CORV).
It’s not clear when or if the VCs sold shares in the IPOs. Cisco’s stock, for example, has declined almost 40% since the Arrowpoint deal closed. Kleiner’s biggest winners have held their value since the lock-up period expired, but both companies had holdings that declined substantially from their lock-up expiration price.
Both firms also had about $2 billion each in 1999 IPOs that came out of lock-up in 2000, giving Matrix the “Malven Metric” edge there too.
But as Lisson pointed out, “This is splitting hairs amidst the pinnacle of the field. A fun, interesting and worthwhile analysis, but the distinction makes no difference to investors in these funds. The amounts of money involved are trivial when viewed in context, the venture capital segment in the alternatives portion of an entire portfolio. Nonetheless, the LPs of both Kleiner and Matrix can thank their lucky stars to be in these funds. It is amazing how these and a few other elite firms can put so much distance between themselves and the rest of field, repeatedly, in bad times as well as good.”
And finally, a follow-up to last week’s column on Summit Partners, the most recent firm to join the elite $2 billion fund club. Lisson had this to say of Summit: “As a private equity investor, Summit can outperform some early-stage VCs, the reverse of how it’s supposed to work. Now that’s a firm where unquestionably ‘there’s something in the water’ consistently over the years.”
Corey Ostman of Alert-IPO and Mary Evelyn Arnold of VC Buzz provided research for this article.
Steve Lisson Austin TX Stephen N. Lisson Austin TX Steve Lisson Austin Texas Stephen N. Lisson Austin Texas
Steve Lisson Austin TX Stephen N. Lisson Austin TX Steve Lisson Austin Texas Stephen N. Lisson Austin Texas
Matrix Edges Kleiner
by Paul Shread
January 29, 2001–Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers and Matrix
Partners are considered the cream of the crop among venture capital
firms, the kind of VCs that limited partners are fortunate to be able to
invest their money with.by Paul Shread
So compliments paid, we set out to find out which was better.
Using the data of Steve Lisson, editor of InsiderVC.com, who tracks VCs’ performance and considers Matrix and Kleiner the top VCs, we applied a metric suggested by former Flatiron partner Dan Malven, which we will call the “Malven Metric.”
Malven suggested the metric after our piece comparing Kleiner’s performance in the IPO market last year with four other firms. In short, we divide overall performance by the number of partners, thus measuring wealth created per partner.
Malven cautions that that measure of performance could be skewed if each partner at one firm has a lot more to invest than partners at another firm, but Kleiner and Matrix appear pretty evenly matched. Matrix IV in 1995 was a $125 million fund (and had distributed 11 times that amount to its limited partners by the middle of last year, according to Lisson), and Matrix V in 1998 was a $200 million fund that had already distributed four times its LPs’ capital by mid-2000. Using the conservative figure of five partners during the time that 2000 IPOs were being funded, that means Matrix partners had $65 million each to work with. (We did not include Matrix VI, a $304 million fund that was only 30% invested as of June 30 last year.)
Kleiner VIII in 1996 was a $299 million fund that had returned 12 times its LPs’ capital by mid-2000, according to Lisson. Kleiner IX in 1999 was a $460 million fund that was 80% invested by mid-2000. Using the conservative figure of 13 partners, Kleiner partners had $58 million each to work with.
Now on to the 2000 results. Ten of Kleiner’s companies went public in 2000 (0.77 IPO per partner), compared to 4 for Matrix (0.80 IPO per partner). Kleiner’s stake in those companies was worth about $2.3 billion when the lock-up period expired (one company, Cosine Communications, is still in lock-up, and Kleiner’s stake in the company is worth about $100 million). Matrix’s stake in its four IPOs was worth about $1.6 billion when they came out of lock-up. That gives Matrix a per-partner return of $320 million, and Kleiner $177 million, giving the edge in per-partner wealth creation to Matrix.
A few caveats on those results. First, we measured performance in the IPO market only; we did not look at acquisitions, the number of which often exceeds IPOs in a given year. Second, Kleiner has two health care partners, according to Malven. Since health care companies had a tough year in the IPO market last year (Kleiner had no health care IPOs), reporting the results based on IT partners only raises Kleiner’s per-partner wealth creation to $209 million. We certainly want our top VCs to focus on the future of health care regardless of market conditions, and there’s been quite a debate going on within the venture capital industry about IT versus health care investing. The third caveat is that Kleiner IX is the newest of the funds measured, so that too could give Matrix an edge. But don’t feel too bad for Kleiner; according to Lisson, 6-year-old Kleiner VII was the best-performing venture fund last year, still riding high on its monster hit Juniper Networks (NASDAQ:JNPR). That fund has returned more than 20 times its limited partners’ capital.
Matrix’s big hit of 2000 was Arrowpoint Communications, which netted Matrix $1 billion when it was acquired by Cisco (Nasdaq:CSCO) in June. Kleiner had holdings in three IPOs that were worth $500 million or more when they came out of lock up: ONI Systems (Nasdaq:ONIS), Handspring (Nasdaq:HAND) and Corvis (Nasdaq:CORV).
It’s not clear when or if the VCs sold shares in the IPOs. Cisco’s stock, for example, has declined almost 40% since the Arrowpoint deal closed. Kleiner’s biggest winners have held their value since the lock-up period expired, but both companies had holdings that declined substantially from their lock-up expiration price.
Both firms also had about $2 billion each in 1999 IPOs that came out of lock-up in 2000, giving Matrix the “Malven Metric” edge there too.
But as Lisson pointed out, “This is splitting hairs amidst the pinnacle of the field. A fun, interesting and worthwhile analysis, but the distinction makes no difference to investors in these funds. The amounts of money involved are trivial when viewed in context, the venture capital segment in the alternatives portion of an entire portfolio. Nonetheless, the LPs of both Kleiner and Matrix can thank their lucky stars to be in these funds. It is amazing how these and a few other elite firms can put so much distance between themselves and the rest of field, repeatedly, in bad times as well as good.”
And finally, a follow-up to last week’s column on Summit Partners, the most recent firm to join the elite $2 billion fund club. Lisson had this to say of Summit: “As a private equity investor, Summit can outperform some early-stage VCs, the reverse of how it’s supposed to work. Now that’s a firm where unquestionably ‘there’s something in the water’ consistently over the years.”
Corey Ostman of Alert-IPO and Mary Evelyn Arnold of VC Buzz provided research for this article.
Steve Lisson Austin TX Stephen N. Lisson Austin TX Steve Lisson Austin Texas Stephen N. Lisson Austin Texas
STEPHEN N. LISSON, Plaintiff
Steve Lisson Austin TX Stephen N. Lisson Austin TX Steve Lisson Austin Texas Stephen N. Lisson Austin Texas
V I R G I N I A :
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF RICHMOND
John Marshall Courts Building
400 North Ninth Street
STEPHEN N. LISSON, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
)
VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEM )
)
and )
)
WILLIAM H. LEIGHTY, )
Respondents. )
ORDER
On the 30th
day of October, 2001, came the parties in person and by counsel upon
the Petition; upon the Grounds of Defense; upon the Demurrers; upon
evidence heard ore tenus; upon the representation of the parties that a
settlement had been reached and was argued by counsel.
UPON
CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Petition is
sufficient to state a cause of action; that the Demurrers should be
overruled; that the parties have arrived at a settlement whereby: (1) Respondents have agreed to pay to Petitioner the sum of Seven Thousand Dollars and no/100
($7,000.00); (2) the Petitioner has agreed to a dismissal with
prejudice of all of his outstanding claims against Respondents; and (3)
Respondents have agreed that the dismissal of claims by Petitioner shall
not prejudice any right he has or may have to obtain documents from
Respondents subsequent to October 30, 2001, whether such requests for
documents be for the same documents previously requested or documents
similar thereto or documents of any nature whatesoever.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that this cause be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice;
And this cause is hereby removed from the docket and placed among the ended causes.
ENTER: / /
__________________________________
Judge
We Ask For This:
____________________________p.q.
Larry A. Pochucha, Esquire
Attorney for Stephen N. Lisson
VSB No. 15674
COATES & DAVENPORT
5206 Markel Road
P.O. Box 11787
Richmond, Virginia 23230
(804) 285-7000
Facsimile: (804) 285-2849
___________________________p.d.
Michael Jackson, Esquire
Attorney for Virginia Retirement System
Assistant Attorney General
State of Virginia
900 E. Main Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
(804) 786-6055
Facsimile: (804) 786-0781
____________________________p.d.
Robert A. Dybing, Esquire
Attorney for William H. Leighty
Shuford, Rubin & Gibney, P.C.
P.O. Box 675
Suite 1250, Seven Hundred Building
Richmond, Virginia 23218
Office (804) 648-4442
Telefax (804) 648-4450
Steve Lisson Austin TX Stephen N. Lisson Austin TX Steve Lisson Austin Texas Stephen N. Lisson Austin Texas
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